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LANDLORD-TENANT LAW:
CHALLENGING THE CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT
CLAUSE IN ILLINOIS RESIDENTIAL LEASES
William L. Niro*
The Illinois Judiciary and General Assembly have given little attention to the disadvantagesand hardships createdfor Illinois tenants
by the confession of judgment clause in form residential leases.
This Article presents certain challenges to confession of judgment
clauses on constitutional and contract law principles, and the author calls for judicial action to align Illinois law with that of the
majority of states by abolishing or restricting the use of such

clauses.
The confession of judgment clause, as it appears in a number of modern
legal instruments, had its origin in the common law of the several states.
Although the exact date of its first use is unknown, Blackstone acknowledged
it as being:
[V]ery usual, in order to strengthen a creditor's security, for the debtor to
execute a warrant of attorney to some attorney named by the creditor,
empowering him to confess judgment by either . .. [nihil dicit, cognovit
actionem or non sum infornnatus] in an action of debt to be brought by the
creditor against the debtor for the specific sum due.1
This Article examines the historical basis and rationale for the confession of
judgment clause. After a discussion of constitutional and contract-based challenges to confession of judgment clauses, it will be demonstrated that judicial reform in this area is an imperative for Illinois law.
HISTORICAL BASIS AND RATIONALE

At common law, judgment by confession could be obtained in two ways:
(1) by judgment after service of process, called the cognovit actionem;2 or
* Associate professor of law, Northern Illinois University College of Law, Glen Ellyn, Illinois.
B.S., University of Pittsburgh; J.D., DePaul University; L.L.M., George Washington University.
1. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 397. See Pyes, Reappraisal of the Confession of
Judgment Law, 48 ILL. B.J. 764 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Pyes]. For an excellent discussion of
the legal history of confession clauses, see generally Contract Purchase Corp. v. Max Keil Real
Estate Co., 35 Del. 351, 170 A. 797 (1933); Lock v. Leslie, 248 Ill. App. 438 (2d Dist. 1928);
First Nat'l Bank v. White, 220 Mo. 717, 120 S.W. 36 (1909); Note, Confessions of Judgment,
102 U. PA. L. REv. 524 (1954).
2. In this type of confessed judgment, the defendant can "confess" the validity of the plaintiff's suit instead of entering a plea. As an alternative, a plea may be entered, but then withdrawn and judgment "confessed." The latter procedure is known as cognovit actionem relicta
verifcatione. Note, Confessions of Judgment in Illinois: The Need for Change Persists, 10 Loy.
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(2) by warrant of attorney whereby the right to service of process is waived
and judgment is entered without notice. 3 The first does not exist under
present Illinois procedural practice. 4 The modern terms "confession of
judgment clause" and "cognovit clause" are commonly used to describe
terms in an agreement which permit judgment to be entered by warrant of
attorney. 5 The clause may appear in a variety of instruments including personal loans, promissory notes, bills, retail installment and conditional sales
contracts, and form leases for real property. The language of a confession of
judgment clause may vary with state law, user preference, and the type of
transaction. The typical confession of judgment clause appearing in an Illinois residential dwelling lease reads:
Lessee hereby irrevocably constitutes any attorney of any court or record
of this state to enter Lessee's appearance in such court, waive process and
service thereof, and confess judgment from time to time, for any rent
which may be due to Lessor or his assignees by the terms of this lease,
with costs and reasonable attorney's fees and to waive all errors and right
of appeal from said judgment and to file a consent in writing that a proper
writ of execution may be issued immediately. 6
While the actual wording may vary among leases, the basic coverage is the
same.
This particular confession of judgment clause is indeed extraordinary in
that the lessee authorizes any attorney, usually one designated by the lessor,
to represent him in court, to confess that the lessee owes the money
claimed, and to enter judgment against him. Further, he stipulates that the
court has personal jurisdiction over him and that he waives all right to notice
of the court proceedings. He also waives his right to appeal the judgment
and consents to immediate issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the
judgment. 7 One court has said that the warrant of attorney, authorizing
entry of judgment without notice:
CtU. L.J. 141 n.8 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Confessions]; Note, Judgments: A Cognovit Clause
Is Not, Per Se, Violative of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 741,
743-44 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Judgments].
3. This procedure allows the judgment to be entered on defendant's behalf by any attorney. Because the clause contains a provision for the defendant's waiver of notice, the judgment
often is entered without the defendant's knowledge or an opportunity to defend. This procedure
is known as judgment debitum sine brevi. Judgments, supra note 2, at 743-44.
4. While a person in his answer may confess or admit the cause pleaded in the complaint,
and judgment may be entered thereon, this procedure is not a confession of judgment in current application or in the strict sense of the words. See Pyes, supra note 1, at 765. See also
Third Nat'l Bank v. Divine Grocery Co., 97 Tenn. 603, 37 S.W. 390 (1896).
5. The terms cognovit and confession of judgment will be used interchangeably throughout
this discussion.
6. Cole Legal Form Apartment Lease, No. L-17 (April 1975). The cognovit is succinctly
defined as "the written authority of the debtor and his direction ... to enter judgment against
him as stated therein." Blott v. Blott, 227 Iowa 1108, 1111-12, 290 N.W. 74, 76 (1940). See also
Guydon v. Taylor, 115 Ind. App. 685, 686, 60 N.E.2d 750, 751 (1945).
7. See Jones v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 930, 935 (W.D. Mich.
1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1969). Note, however, that Illinois Supreme Court Rule
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[I]s perhaps the most powerful and drastic document known to civil law.
The signer deprives himself of every defense and every delay of execution
.
he places his cause in the hands of a hostile defender. The signing of
a warrant of attorney is equivalent to a warrior of old entering a combat by
discarding his shield and breaking his sword."

The reasons underlying common law recognition of the cognovit clause
were to protect creditors, to broaden remedies against delinquent debtors,
and to increase the availability and completion of credit sales. 9 The procedure obviously provided an inexpensive means of entering and satisfying
judgments. Yet, dissatisfaction with common law practices and a desire to
preserve the debtor's day in court led many states to invalidate confession of
judgment agreements on public policy grounds.1 0 Too often those individuals least able to understand the legal ramifications of the clause, particularly
the poor and uneducated, were the victims of its enforcement. The areas of
consumer sales, small loans, and home solicitation contracts were particularly
prone to abuse." In addition, the debtor had to pay for attorney's fees and
court costs, while assuming the burden of proving that due process rights
2
were not waived.'
276, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 276 (1977), provides for the opening of judgment by confession. Rule 276 requires that the filing of a motion to open a judgment shall be supported by an
affidavit (prepared pursuant to rule 191) which discloses a prima facie defense on the merits to
all or part of the plaintiff's demand, and shall be accompanied by a verified answer which
defendant proposes to file. The defendant must be diligent in presenting his motion to open,
but the court is empowered to grant or deny the motion at its discretion. The issue of "diligence in presenting the motion to open" has been litigated in American Nat'l Bank and Trust v.
Colby, 19 I11. App. 3d 1051, 273 N.E.2d 19 (1st Dist. 1974) (motion filed one year and five
months after notice held to lack diligence and therefore denied); Inland Real Estate Corp. v.
Slymon, 56 Il1. App. 3d 581, 371 N.E.2d 1187 (1st Dist. 1977) (failure to attach affidavit pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 191 held fatal to motion to open judgment); Kuh v. Williams, 13
I11. App. 3d 588, 301 N.E.2d 151 (1st Dist. 1973) (motion filed two months after notice of
confessed judgment held to be due diligence); Windsor Dev. Co. v. Segal, 10 II1. App. 3d 322,
293 N.E.2d 719 (4th Dist. 1973) (motion filed four months after entry of judgment held to lack
diligence and therefore denied); Wolfe v. Endres, 113 I11.App. 2d 96, 251 N.E.2d 740 (1st
Dist. 1969) (motion filed four months after entry of judgment failed diligence requirement). See
also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1977), which provides for relief from judgments and decrees; Id. § 73, which provides for supplemental proceedings available to the judgment creditor
after entry of judgment (for example, issuance of a citation to discover assets or initiation of
garnishment proceedings).
8. Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 4-5, 97 A.2d 234, 236 (1953). It has also been said
that "such agreements are iniquitous to the uttermost and should be promptly condemned by
the courts." First Nat'l Bank v. White, 220 Mo. 717, 728, 120 S.W. 36, 42 (1909).
9. See, e.g., Hadden v. Rumsen Prod. Inc., 196 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1952). The purpose of
the cognovit is "to permit the note holder to obtain judgment without a trial of possible defenses which the signers of the note might assert." Id. at 96.
10. See 25 VAND. L. REV. 613 n.13 (1972) [hereinafter cited as VAND. L. REV.]. See, e.g.,
ARIz. REV, STAT. ANN. § 44-153 (1956); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2906 (1968); N.J. REv. STAT. §
2A: 16-9 (1951). For examples of states which have limited the use of the clause, see CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 52-193 to -195 (1958); NEW YORK CIV. PRAC. § 3218 (McKinney 1963).
11. Confessions, supra note 2, at 58. See notes 94-96 and accompanying text infra.
12. VAND. L. REV., supra note 10, at 620.
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Legal commentators have been critical of cognovits.5 3 One such writer
has specifically called for "legislative reappraisal" of confession of judgment
clauses in credit sales in Illinois.14 Attempts to pass legislation restricting
the use of cognovits or confession of judgment clauses have not been successful in the Illinois General Assembly. 15 Until recently, Illinois continued
to recognize the clause in virtually all types of transactions, including the
signing of residential property leases. 16 In October, 1979, House Bill 2678
was enacted into law, amending section 50(3) of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act. The amendment provides that:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection (3), any person may confess judgment by himself or attorney duly authorized, without process.

No power to confess judgment shall be required or given after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1979 in any instrument used in a con-

sumer transaction: any power to confess given is in violation hereof is null
and void and any judgment entered by a court based on such a power
shall be unenforceable. "Consumer transaction" as used in this Section
means a sale, lease, assignment, loan or other disposition of an item of
goods, a consumer service, or an intangible to an individual for purposes

that are primarily personal, family or household.'

7

The amendatory language defining "consumer transactions" can arguably be
construed to apply to only leases of "items of goods." Because of this limiting
language, Illinois tenants will have to await judicial interpretation of the provision.
13. Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 791 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Berger]. See Confessions, supra note 2. See also Comment, Cognovit Judgments: Some Constitutional Considerations, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1970); Comment, Confessions of Judgment: The Due Process Defects, 43 TEM P. L.Q. 279 (1970); Note, An Attack on Confession of
Judgment Clauses in Residential Leases Through Section 2-302 of the U.C.C., 50 CH.-KENT L.
REV. 482 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Attack]; Note, Confessions of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L.
REV. 524 '(1954). Confession clauses can also be challenged as a violation of federal truth-inlending laws. See Horowitz, Confession of Judgment Clauses as Violating Federal Truth-inLending Where Creditors Have Waived Their Right to Have Liens Placed on Obliger's Residences, 66 ILL. B.J. 688 (1978).
14. Pyes, supra note 1, at 764.
15. Attack, supra note 13, at 496-97. See H.B. 1377, and S.B. 535, 80th 111.Gen. Assembly
(1978), for attempts to enact a modern Residential Landlord-Tenant Act.
16. The Illinois Supreme Court has found "no constitutional objection to confession of
judgment per se." First Nat'l Bank v. Keisman, 47 I11.2d 364, 366, 265 N.E.2d 662, 663 (1970).
See Fields v. Brown, 188 I11. 111, 58 N.E. 977 (1901); Scott v. Mantonya, 164 111.473, 45 N.E.
977 (1897); Fortune v. Bartolomei, 164 I1l. 51, 45 N.E. 274 (1896); Snyder Bros. v. Bailey, 165
I11.447, 46 N.E. 452 (1896); Cutler v. Leader Cleaners, Inc., 12 Ill. App. 2d 439, 139 N.E.2d
832 (1st Dist. 1957).
17. H.B. 2678, 81st I11. Gen. Assembly (1979), amending ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 50(3)
(1977) (emphasis added). The unamended section providing for confession of judgment without
process has consistently been held valid by the Illinois courts. This section of the Civil Practice
Act has been held valid by the Illinois courts in First Nat'l Bank v. Keisman, 47 I11.2d 364, 265
N.E.2d 622 (1970). See Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 I11.App. 3d 225, 326 N.E.2d 542
(1st Dist. 1975); Ives v. May, 5 Ill. App. 3d 193, 282 N.E.2d 193 (1st Dist. 1972).
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As a result of Illinois' adherence to the common law position, the tenant is
placed in the position of attempting to open the judgment under existing
Illinois practice procedures. 18 Notice of judgment against the tenant/debtor
may reach the tenant by way of a summons to confirm judgment by confession 19 or, as in many cases, when his bank or employer notifies the tenant/
debtor that a garnishment summons has been served upon him, thereby
freezing the tenant/debtor's funds or salary. 20 Appalled by such practices,
the California Supreme Court has stated that "experience has shown that the
confession of judgment procedure lends itself to overreaching, deception,
and abuse."- 21 The New York Court of Appeals likewise has condemned
confessed judgments as "the loosest way of binding a man's property that
22
ever was devised in a civilized country."
In the modern setting, most urban property rentals are made through
form leases, the vast majority of which contain a confession of judgment
clause. 2 3 With the currently rapid conversion of apartments to condominiums and the resulting premium on rental units, tenants are in no
position to negotiate removal of confession of judgment clauses from form
leases.2 4 Thus, armed with a form lease authorizing confession of judgment
and a specific procedural rule permitting entry of judgment "without process," the landlord can put tenants at a great disadvantage in asserting their
rights when a dispute over their tenancy arises. 25 The actual surrender of
constitutionally guaranteed due process rights accomplished by a tenant who
signs a form lease containing a cognovit provision raises sufficient grounds
for challenging the constitutional validity of such a clause. It may also be
challenged under contract law grounds as being adhesive or unconscionable. 26
18. See note 7 supra. Four separate documents must be filed by a person seeking to open a
judgment by confession: (1) notice of motion; (2) the written motion asserting diligence in filing
and a meritorious defense; (3) an affidavit pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 191; and (4) a
verified answer the movant proposes to file.
19. See text accompanying notes 101-05, infra; Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272, 1274
(N.D. Ill. 1972).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 13, 73 (1977). See also id. at ch. 110a, § 277.
21. Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d 61, 71, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368, 373, 577 P.2d 188,
193 (1978).
22. Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 225, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387, 250 N.E.2d
474, 478 (1969), quoting Alderman v. Diamet, 7 N.J.L. 197, 198 (1828).
23. Kirby, Contract Law and the Form Lease: Can Contract Law Provide the Answer?, 71
Nw. U.L. REV. 204 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kirby]. The Chicago Real Estate Board estimates that 98% of all written leases in Chicago are executed on standardized forms.
24. Unger, Chicago Rents May Skyrocket 13% as Landlords Enjoy 'Seller's Market', Chicago
Tribune, Mar. 26, 1978, § 1, at 3, col. 4. See Brenner, Condos. Inflation Gang Upon Renters,
Chicago Tribune, Mar. 11, 1979, § 4, at 1, col. 3.
25. The abuse of tenants' rights in eviction court has been well documented in LEGAL
ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION

OF CHICAGO, ET AL., JUDGMENT LANDLORD: A STUDY OF
EVICTION COURT IN CHICAGO (1978). See also Swygert, Consumer Protection, 23 DEPAUL L.
REv. 98, 110-28 (1973).

26. Enforcing a money judgment obtained in Illinois by confession of judgment in a sister
state raises another set of issues beyond the scope of this article. For an in-depth study of the
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STATE ACTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

In claiming that a cognovit procedure is an unconstitutional denial of due
process, a tenant must establish that: (1) action by the state is involved; (2)
the state action deprives the complainant of a property right; and (3) the
deprivation was effected without such process as is due under the cir27
cumstances, or that the alleged waiver of process was invalid.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that action inhibited by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is "only such action as may
fairly be said to be that of the States." 2 8 The clause provides no protection
against wrongful conduct of individuals in their private capacities. However,
"that the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities
is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is a proposition which has long been established by decisions
of the Court." 2 9 The inclusion of a cognovit clause in a lease is "determined, in the first instance, by the terms of [the] agreements among private
individuals." 30 Thus, the mere existence of a cognovit provision cannot be
considered state action for fourteenth amendment purposes. However, the
cognovit provision is enforced in the state courts. Because the Supreme Court
has determined that judicial action is to be regarded as action of the state for
the purposes of the fourteenth amendment, the requisite "state action" is
present whenever the action for entry of judgment by confession is filed in
the appropriate circuit court. 31
Once state action is established, the defendant (tenant) must prove that
the interest sought to be protected is one of property within the scope of the
fourteenth amendment. 32 Illinois courts recognize that a money judgment

full faith and credit issue, see Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process
and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 111 (1961); Paulsen, Enforcing the Money
Judgment of a Sister State, 42 IowA L. REV. 208 (1957); Comment, Cognovit Judgments and
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 50 B.U.L. REV. 330 (1970); 56 VA. L. REV. 554 (1970);
Comment, The Effect of Full Faith and Credit on Cognovit Judgments, 42 U. COLO. L. REV.
173 (1970); 74 DICK. L. REV. 750 (1970).
27. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1970) (importance of necessity for due process
before deprivation of property or liberty interest); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (lack
of hearing before termination of public assistance violated due process); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967) (state action present where prestige or authority of state encourages or supports
private action); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state action present when state court
enforced restrictive covenant); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (state action must be
present to find denial of 14th-amendment rights).
28. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). See also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883). But see Gibson v. Dixon, 579 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1978); Adams v. Southern Calif. First
Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
29. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).
30. Id. at 13.
31. Id. at 13-14. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880); Moore v. McDaniel, 48 Il.
App. 3d 152, 164, 362 N.E.2d 382, 392 (5th Dist. 1977).
32. The institute of property is in a great state of flux with the emergence of government as
a major source of wealth. Through subsidies, franchises, occupational licenses, jobs, and public
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is a significant property interest. 33 In addition, the United States Supreme
Court and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois have ruled that a fourteenth amendment property interest exists even
when a person lacks full title to the property, or when the deprivation may
only be temporary, subject to a determination in a post-deprivation hearing. 34 Thus, the procedure utilized to enter a money judgment by confession, even where post-deprivation hearings are possible, is subject to procedural due process guarantees. Clearly, no serious issue regarding state
action or a legally sufficient property interest would arise in a landlord-tenant
confession of judgment case. The right to some measure of procedural due
process seems guaranteed. The most significant legal questions relating to
the cognovit clause are raised in the context of whether procedural due process guarantees have been afforded.
Due Process and Waiver
Once the tenant has established the existence of the requisite state action
and a property interest sufficient of protection, he must establish that he has
not been accorded the procedural safeguards due him. The tenant must assert that the appropriate form of notice and hearing required under the circumstances, given the nature of the competing interests involved, has been
denied. However, in a cognovit situation, the requisite due process protection allegedly has been waived. Thus, the crucial question arises: does the
mere signing of a form lease containing a confession clause effectively waive
the tenant's constitutional rights?
Due process rights have been held to be subject to waiver in both a criminal and civil context, but only if the waiver has been made "voluntarily,
housing the government is creating new forms of wealth and hence establishing a new form of
property in the expectation of continued flow of government largesse. Deprivations of this new
property and the attendant constitutional problems associated with such deprivations are reshaping the law and the result is a broader application of due process rights by the courts. See
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974); Paige v. Harris, 584 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1978); Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The
New Property:" Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445
(1977).
33. Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 Il. App. 3d 225, 228, 326 N.E.2d 542, 544 (1st
Dist. 1975).
34. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (Florida prejudgment replevin statute provided
for deprivation of household goods where title remained in the creditor pursuant to a retail
installment sales contract); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (deprivation of statutory
welfare benefits prior to hearing); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (temporary deprivation of wages through garnishment pending outcome of suit); Scott v. Danaher, 343
F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. I11. 1972) (Illinois prejudgment garnishment law violates due process
clause of fourteenth amendment); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. 111.
1972) (Illinois Innskeeper Lien Law authorizing seizure of goods without notice declared unconstitutional); Goliday v. Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (termination of public
assistance grants without notice and hearing under Illinois Public Aid Code violates due process).
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intelligently and knowingly ... and with full awareness of the legal consequences." 35 D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. 36 was the first opportunity the Supreme Court had to rule on the constitutionality of confession of
judgment clauses. In that case, Overmyer Company, a debtor corporation,
executed an installment note to Frick Company for past-due sums and for
new equipment yet to be installed at Overmyer's facility in Ohio. Overmyer
had difficulty making payments and, therefore, executed a new note, for
consideration, extending payments over a longer period of time. The new
note contained a confession of judgment clause. The cognovit was a typical
warrant of attorney waiving notice and authorizing Frick Company to confess
judgment should the debtor default on the note. Most importantly, Overmyer Company was represented by legal counsel in all the negotiations and
in the signing of the notes. Ultimately, Overmyer ceased payment, whereupon Frick Company confessed judgment. Overmyer's motion to vacate the
judgment on due process grounds was denied. The denial was upheld by
both the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Ohio. 37
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Overmyer asserted as
grounds for relief that: (1) it had been denied due process because it was not
given notice of the action or an opportunity to be heard; and (2) the purported waiver of notice and right to present a defense was invalid. 38 The
Court rejected both assertions on the basis that precedent had established
that "ItIhe due process rights to notice and hearing prior to a civil judgment
are subject to waiver," 3 9 and further, "that parties to a contract may agree
in advance . . . to waive notice altogether." 40 Thus, based on the facts of
the case, the Court ruled that Overmyer Company had waived its right to
prejudgment notice and hearing "voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly
• . and . .. with full awareness of the legal consequences." 41 The Court
stated, however, that the critical facts presented in Overmyer, especially

35. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Illinois v. Allen, 397

U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964);
United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1181 (3d Cir. 1978). See Cohen, Current Decisions on
Confession of Judgment, 61 ILL. B.J. 603 (1973).
36. 405 U.S. 174 (1972). Prior to Overmyer, the Court had decided only two cases concerning cognovit notes, both in a full faith and credit context. See National Exch. Bank v. Wiley,
195 U.S. 257 (1904); Grover & Baker Sewing Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890). See
also note 25 supra. For a discussion of Overmyer, see Winslow, Constitutional Law-Cognovit
Notes: Pretrial Waiver of Constitutional Rights in Civil Cases, 51 N.C.L. REV. 554 (1973);
Note, Cognovit Revisited: Due Process and Confession of Judgment, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1045
(1973); Judgments, supra note 2; Case Comment, Judgments: The Cognovit Clause and Due
Process, U. FLA. L. REV. 376 (1973); VAND. L. REV., supra note 10.
37. 405 U.S. 174, 178-82 (1972).

38. Id. at 184. Specifically, Overmyer asserted that it is "unconstitutional to waive in advance the right to present a defense in an action on the note." Id.

39. Id. at 185.
40. Id., citing National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964).
41. Id. at 187.
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that the parties were corporations represented by legal counsel, could give
rise to a different result in other circumstances, if not present. Specifically,
the Court noted that "[o]ur holding, of course, is not controlling precedent
for other facts of other cases. For example, where the contract is one of
adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and where the
debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision, other legal consequences
may ensue." 4 2 In a concluding comment, the Court stated:
Our holding necessarily means that a cognovit clause is not, per se, violative of Fourteenth Amendment due process .... The facts of this case
• . . are important, and those facts amply demonstrate that a cognovit provision may well serve a proper and useful purpose in the commercial
43
world.
Overmyer was applied to uphold Pennsylvania's cognovit rule in Swarb v.
Lennox aa decided the same day. Swarb was a class action challenge to the
constitutionality of judgments by confession against Pennsylvania consumer
debtors who had signed conditional sales contracts containing a cognovit
clause. The Court cited its decision in Overmyer to support the conclusion
that the Pennsylvania rules and statutes relating to cognovit provisions were
not unconstitutional on their face. The Court emphasized that "under appropriate circumstances, a cognovit debtor may be held effectively and legally to have waived those rights he would possess if the document he
signed had contained no cognovit provision." 4 " However, the Court did not
disturb that portion of the district court ruling that held the Pennsylvania
procedure unconstitutional only as it applied to Pennsylvania residents earning less than $10,000 per year. That limitation was based on a consumer
study of default debtors in four Pennsylvania cities. a6 The district court
cited this study and other testimony to support its findings that there was no
intentional waiver of a known right by the members of the class earning less
than $10,000 per year and that the debtors did not fully understand the
rights which they were relinquishing by signing the cognovit notes. 47 Because the notes were signed and judgments confessed "based on the concept
of waiver of notice without adequate understanding by the debtor," the
entry of those judgments was a violation of the due process clause of the
48
fourteenth amendment.
42. Id. at 188.
43. Id. at 186-87. This rule was reiterated in Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 200 (1972),
which was decided on the same day as Ovennyer.
44. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
45. Id. at 200.
46. The study indicated that 96% of the judgment debtors had incomes less than $10,000
annually (56% less than $6,000); only 30% had graduated from high school; and only 14% knew
that the contracts they had signed contained cognovit clauses. Id. at 198, relying on D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE (1968).
47. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See 16 ViLL. L. REv. 571
(1971).
48. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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Within the month, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
a Delaware statute authorizing confession of judgment. 49 In Osmond v.
Spence, 50 a federal district court recognized the prevailing rule that constitutional rights to notice and hearing are subject to waiver, but held that because of the strong presumption against waiver of constitutional rights, there
must be clear evidence of waiver before the court will hold the waiver effective. 51 The court concluded:
[T]he very facts of this case demonstrate the soundness of such a rule, for
a mere glance at the waiver clause contained in a typical judgment note
raises serious doubt whether the average debtor could have any meaningful understanding of the legal implications of the effect of his signature
52
thereto.
The District Court of Delaware held the statute to be fatally defective in
that "by failing to provide for notice and hearing preceding the entry of
judgment, there [was] no method of judicially determining whether or not a
particular debtor knowingly and intelligently signed the judgment note
thereby waiving his 14th amendment rights." 53 The determination of
whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right must depend, in
each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the surrender. Significant areas of inquiry include the background, experience,
education, intelligence, and conduct of persons waiving their rights. While
the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for further consideration
in light of Swarb and Overmyer, 54 the Delaware decision rests on fundamentally sound constitutional principles applicable in current consumer or
landlord-tenant disputes involving the confession of judgment clause.
On remand, the Delaware court adhered to its original ruling that the
signed cognovit alone is not adequate proof of waiver and that the waiver
determination must be made by the court prior to entry of judgment. 55 The
court stated:

49. Osmond v. Spence, 405 U.S. 971 (1972).
50. 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971).
51. The Supreme Court has held that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393
(1937); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882). Furthermore, the Court requires that "for a
waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' " Brookhart v. Janus, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966),
quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n,
301 U.S. 292 (1937).
52. Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349, 1359 (D. Del. 1971).
53. Id. The court stated further that "the mere signature of the debtor on a judgment note,
without more, [is insufficient to overcome] the strong presumption against the waiver of one's
constitutional rights." Id.
54. Osmond v. Spence, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
55. Osmond v. Spence, 359 F. Supp. 124, 126-27 (D. Del. 1972).
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Unless a hearing is conducted on the waiver question before the judgment
is entered, an alleged debtor will be deprived of his due process rights oil
everv, occasion when an effective waiver had not occurred upon initial
execution of the note. The only procedure guaranteeing that such a deprivation will not take place is to require hearings on the waiver issue before
56
permitting judgments to be entered.
In formulating a challenge to the confession of judgment clause in Illinois

residential dwelling leases, a facial attack on the underlying statute would be
precluded by Overnyer, Swarb, and Osmond. However, each decision specifically recognized that under certain circumstances the waiver of due process rights can be challenged. The solution lies in a prejudgment determination of effective waiver which would require creditors to prove, prior to
entry of judgment, that the debtor knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his rights to notice and hearing. The concept is rationally based on

sound constitutional principles and a need for fairness and reasonableness in
modern landlord-tenant, debtor-creditor relations.

The position advocated here is further supported by a series of Supreme
Court cases in which various summary creditor remedies were held to be
unconstitutional. These decisions stress the importance of prejudgment
notice and hearing prior to deprivations of certain property interests.
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.5 7 invalidated a Wisconsin prejudgment
wage garnishment statute. Goldberg v. Kelly 58 struck down a New York
state agency regulation permitting termination of welfare benefits without a
hearing. Fuentes v. Shevin 59 held unconstitutional Florida and Pennsylvania
statutes allowing a prejudgment writ of replevin to issue without notice. The
Supreme Court declared the rights deprived to be so important that even
statutory provisions for hearings subsequent to the deprivation were insufficient to cure the unconstitutionality of the prehearing procedures. As the
Court held in Fuentes, the right to notice and hearing must be granted at a
"meaningful time," that is, at a time "when the deprivation can still be prevented." 6 0
CHALLENGES BASED ON CONTRACT LAW

As an alternative to constitutional attacks, a challenge to the cognovit/
confession of judgment clause in a residential dwelling lease can derive from
56. Id. at 127.
57. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
58. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
59. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
60. Id. at 80-81. See Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. I11. 1972); Osmond v.
Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349, 1355 (D. Del. 1971); Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d 61,
145 Cal. Rptr. 368, 577 P.2d 188 (1978) (California confession of judgment statute held unconstitutional because it failed to provide for prejudgment judicial determination of the validity of a
waiver and adequate postjudgment relief). See also text accompanying notes 43-46 supra and
101-113 infra. But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (postjudgment procedural safeguards adequate to protect due process rights where deprivation is only temporary).
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contract law principles. 6 At common law, a lease is regarded primarily as a
conveyance governed by the law of real property, and insofar as the lease
transfers an estate to the lessee, it is primarily a conveyance. However, a
lease presents aspects of a contract as well. 62 The dual character (conveyance and contract) of a lease thus creates two sets of correlative rights

and duties-one set growing out of the landlord-tenant relationship, which
is based on privity of estate, and the other emerging from the express
agreements in the lease, which is based on privity of contract. As the leading
authority on contract law has noted, "those features of the lease which are
strictly contractual in their nature should be construed according to the rules
63
for the interpretation of contracts generally."

Further, a number of state courts have expressly recognized the residential lease as a contract. 64 The Illinois Supreme Court, in its landmark decision of Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 65 adopted the reasoning of Javins v. First

National Realty Co. 66 and concluded that leases for apartments are to be

61. See Kirby, supra note 23; Attack, supra note 13.
62. See University Club v. Deakin, 265 I11.257, 106 N.E. 790 (1914); S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 890 (3d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON]; Hicks, The ContractualNature of
Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443 (1972); Note, Contract Principles and Leases of
Realty, 50 B.U.L. REV. 24 (1970).
63. WILLISTON, supra note 62, at § 890. See generally 7039 Wentworth Ave. Bldg. Corp. v.
Trough, 332 I11.App. 635, 76 N.E.2d 350 (1st Dist. 1947).
64. javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Santiago v. McElroy,
319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168,
111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Pines v.
Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
65. 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 208, 223 (1972). The landlords in Spring sought to
recover possession of the tenant's apartment for non-payment of rent. The Illinois Supreme
Court, relying on Javins, for the first time held that an implied warranty of habitability existed
in a contract between a landlord and a tenant covering an apartment in a multiple unit dwelling. The implied warrant of habitability could be fulfilled if the landlord substantially complied
with the Chicago Building Code. Id. at 366, 280 N.E.2d at 214. The court, quoting Javins,
stated: "In our judgment, the old no repair rule [for landlords] cannot coexist with the obligations imposed on the landlord by a typical modern housing code, and must be abandoned in
favor of an implied warranty of habitability." Id. at 363, 280 N.E.2d at 215, quoting Javins v.
First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The defendants could raise
the breach of the implied warranty as an affirmative defense to an action for possession. Id. at
366, 280 N.E,2d at 217.
66. 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). In this case, a
landlord brought an action seeking possession of the tenant's premises for non-payment of rent.
The court held that the provisions of a lease must be construed according to contract law rather
than property law because the modern urban tenant no longer is conveyed an interest in land,
but rather "a well known package of goods and services." Id. at 1074. Thus, the court read an
implied warranty of habitability into an apartment lease on the grounds that: 1) the historical
basis for absolving a landlord of a duty to repair-the singular importance of the land and not
the dwelling-no longer is present; 2) landlord-tenant law should be made consistent with
consumer protection law; and 3) the dynamics of the modern housing market require protection
of the tenant. Id. at 1077-80. Also, the court found that the local housing code should be read
into any lease. Id. at 1081. For all these reasons, the Javins court held the breach of the
implied warranty to be a defense to an action for rent. See also Boston Housing Auth. v.
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treated as contracts. While Javins and Spring dealt with implied warranties
of habitability rather than confessions of judgment, the conclusion that a
lease is to be treated as a contract allows the validity of cognovit provisions
to be analyzed according to principles of contract law. In Irmco Hotels Corp.
V. Solomon,6 7 for example, an Illinois appellate court characterized a cog68
novit provision in a lease as a "contractual provision."
The Cognovit Clause as an Adhesive Contract Term
An adhesive contract term describes a term or condition usually contained
in a form contract drafted unilaterally by a dominant party in which the
weaker party adheres to the terms as presented. His adherence is unwilling,
and usually unknowing. 69 The dominant party presents conditions which
must be accepted on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis, with no opportunity for
bargaining, and under such conditions that the second party, or "adherer,"
cannot obtain the desired product or service without acquiescing in the form
70
agreement. The "leave it" alternative normally is not a viable option.
The Javins court expressly found that the use of standardized form leases
71
means that landlords place tenants in such "take-it-or-leave-it" situations.
Also, the court recognized the well-documented inequality of bargaining
power between a landlord and tenant, and noted that the "increasingly severe shortage of adequate housing further increases the landlord's bargaining
power." 72 So common is this situation that one court took judicial notice of
the fact "that form leases are put beibre tenants on an 'accept this or get
nothing' basis, and that tenants-who need housing-are compelled to
sign." 73 The modern decisions are replete with expressions of judicial condemnation of inequalities in bargaining power and the take-it-or-leave-it
situations presented in modern consumer credit and landlord-tenant transactions. 74 Judge J. Skelly Wright has stated that "[als judges, 'we cannot shut

Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973), for a thorough discussion of the dependency of covenants in a lease.
67. 27 I11.
App. 3d 225, 326 N.E.2d 542 (1st Dist. 1975).
68. Id. at 228, 326 N.E.2d at 544.
69. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1072,
1075 (1953). See Strauch v. Charles Apartments Co., 1 IU.App. 3d 1051, 273 N.E.2d 19 (2d
Dist. 1974).
70. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966).
71. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
72. Id. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969); Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d 61, 577 P.2d 188, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1978);
Conyers v. Molloy, 50 II1. App. 3d 17, 20, 364 N.E.2d 986, 988 (4th Dist. 1977); 6 A. CoRBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1376 (1962). See also 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
221(1), at 185 (1977).
73. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
74. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 625 (1970); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687
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our eyes to matters of public notoriety and general cognizance. When we
take our seats on the bench we are not struck with blindness, and forbidden
to know as judges what we see as men.' "75
Since it is readily accepted that the typical Illinois form lease is a contract,
judicial interpretation and construction should follow normal contract principles. However, adhesion contracts present a difficult situation for the courts
because judicial rules of contract construction are premised on mutuality of
agreement and the doctrine of freedom of contract. 76 Also, contract interpretation usually proceeds on the basis that "one is held to know and be
bound by the contract he makes" and is premised on the concept of freedom
of contract or arms length bargaining between the parties. Freedom of contract, mutual agreement, and equal bargaining power are notably absent in
adhesion contracts. Thus, legal scholars have called for judicial reform in the
interpretation and enforcement of standard form adhesion contracts:
The remedy for the problems of the standard form is simple. Nonbargained forms must be recognized as different from bargained contracts and
hence not subject to traditional contract principles. Separating the bargained from the nonbargained presents no difficulty. Bargained transactions look bargained. They show give and take on both sides and are
tailored to the particulars of an individual situation. Their nonbargained
forms reflecting the incounterparts are evidenced by mass produced
77
terests of the party who produced them.
Without announcing general principles applicable in every situation, some
courts have granted relief from onerous, adhesive contract terms after considering and balancing a variety of factors: viz (1) the context of the transaction as a whole; (2) Jocation of the clause on the form; (3) whether the meaning of the clause was obscured by language used; (4) policy against waivers of
constitutional rights; (5) one-sidedness of the terms; (6) fairness; and (7) surprise. 78 The fact that one or more of these factors are present in the lease
situation is sufficient basis to justify a court determination invalidating the
cognovit as an adhesive contract term.
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284
2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
(E.D. Pa. 1970); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 I11.
75. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969).
76. Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 125 (1962).
77. Kirby, supra note 23, at 216. See Berger, supra note 13. See also Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion: Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Slawson,
Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REV.
529 (1971).
78. See notes 8, 34, & 52, supra. Karl Llewellyn suggests the last factor should be determinative in deciding which clauses were freely bargained:
[Firee contract presupposes free bargain, and . . . free bargain presupposes free
bargaining; and .. .where bargaining is absent in fact, the conditions and clauses to
be read into a bargain are not those which happen to be printed on the unread
paper, but are those which a sane man might reasonably expect to find on that
paper.
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The contract law concept of unconscionability provides an additional
source for challenging the cognovit clause in the residential lease.
Unconscionable contract terms are those which are grossly one-sided or
whose consequences are harsh. While no precise definition of unconscionability exists, application of the concept is recognized by the Uniform Commercial Code for the purpose of preventing "oppressive and unfair
surprise." 79 The basic characteristics of adhesion contracts, particularly
"one-sidedness," are also the prime considerations in measuring
unconscionability. Further, the notion that an unconscionable bargain should not
be given full enforcement has been expressed in prior case law.8 0 In the
landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,81 the New Jersey
court invalidated, as unconscionable, a term in a standardized form contract
between two parties with grossly unequal bargaining positions. A "take-itor-leave-it" situation was present since all contracts for similar products con82
tained the same clause.
Five years after Henningsen, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied a similar analysis in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co. 8 3 The court stated that "when a party of little bargaining power, and

Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 704 (1939). See Weaver v. American Oil Co.,
257 Ind. 458, 464-65, 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (1971):
Caveat lessee is no more the current law than caveat emptor .... The party seeking to enforce such a contract [unconscionable] has the burden of showing that the
provisions were explained to the other party and came to his knowledge and there
was in fact a real and voluntary meeting of the minds and not merely an objective
meeting. . . . (Emphasis provided by the court.)

In Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 10, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67, 71 (1972), the
court stated: "The doctrine of unconscionability is used by the courts to protect those who are
unable to protect themselves and to prevent injustice, both in consumer and non-consumer
areas." See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-302 (1977); Attack, supra note 13; Note, SalesUnconscionable Contract or Clause-Uniform Commercial Code, 15 DEPAUL L. REV. 499
(1966).
79. U.C.C. § 2-302, official comment 1. The doctrine of unconscionability springs from
equity decisions like Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948). See A. CoBaiN,
CoNTRcCs § 128 (1963). See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445
(D.C.Cir. 1965); Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971); note 80
infra.
80. Gelderman & Co., Inc. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1975); see
Fluor Western, Inc. v. G & H Offshore Towing Co., 447 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 922 (1972); Contract Buyers League v. F.&F. Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. II1. 1969),
aff'd, Baker v. F.&F. Inv., 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 82 (1970);
Walter E. Heller & Co., Inc. v. Convalescent Home of the First Church of Deliverance, 49 Ill.
App. 3d 213, 365 N.E.2d 1285 (1st
Dist. 1977); Neal v. Jacob, 31 111. App. 3d 137, 334 N.E.2d
435 (1st Dist. 1975).
81. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
82. Id. at 390, 161 A.2d at 85-88.
83. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:645

hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent . . .was
ever given to all the terms." 8 4 Judge J. Skelly Wright concluded that it is
"an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together
with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party"
which gives rise to a finding of unconscionability. 85 In any particular case,
the determination of reasonableness or fairness, and finding the presence of
a meaningful choice, requires an examination of the circumstances existing
when the contract was made. "The test is not simple, nor can it be mechani86
cally applied."
In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by the gross
inequality of bargaining power.8 7 Therefore, a court, prior to entering a
judgment by confession, should make at least minimum inquiry into such
matters and closely examine these factors when affirmatively raised by a defendant. Otherwise, requiring a judgment debtor to open the judgment prior
to receiving a hearing is a waste of judicial time, requires duplication of
effort, and further burdens the already overcrowded court system.
In Personal Finance Co. v. Meredith,8s Illinois' Fifth Appellate District
indicated that Illinois authority "[does] not displace the common law principle that an unconscionable contract or clause is unenforceable." 8 9 After
careful analysis of the agreement, the court held that the waiver of defense
clause in a retail installment sales contract was valid under the facts because
defendants had failed to prove surprise, lack of understanding, unequal bargaining power, or lack of meaningful choice. 90 The principles of unconscionability established in Williams, Henningsen, and a host of other cases
therefore should be wholly applicable to judicial analysis of contract terms in
Illinois.

84. Id. at 449.
85. Id.
86. 1d. at 450.
87. Id.at 449 n.7. One of those factors to be examined, and often a crucial one, is the
inequality of bargaining power. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972);
Piercy v. Heyison, 565 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1977) (court distinguished Overmyer in part because
there was unequal bargaining power between the debtor and the creditor, a "financial giant").
See also Strauch v. Charles Apt. Co., 1 11. App. 3d 57, 62, 273 N.E.2d 19, 23 (2d Dist. 1971).
88. 39 IIl. App. 3d 695, 350 N.E.2d 781 (5th Dist. 1976).
89. Id. at 702, 350 N.E.2d at 788. The plaintiff brought suit to recover payments owed
under two installment sales contracts it obtained by assignment from the seller. Although these
contracts technically were security agreements rather than negotiable instruments, the court
nevertheless held they were similar enough to require notice to the buyer of the waiver of
defense clauses. Id. at 698, 350 N.E.2d at 786. The court found the notice to be present in
these contracts and noted that defendants should have read the provisions. id. The case was
remanded because the trial court had erred in excluding testimony relevant to whether the
plaintiff had actual knowledge or notice of the seller's past failure to fulfill contractual obligations. If it had such notice, the plaintiff would not be protected by the waiver of defense clause.
Id. at 700-01, 350 N.E.2d at 788.
90. Id.at 704, 350 N.E.2d at 790. The court noted that the waiver of defense clause in
question was analogous to a confession of judgment clause and that "the use of these provisions
can be abused." Id.
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While Williams, Henningsen, and Personal Finance dealt with contracts
for the sale of goods rather than a residential dwelling lease, the Personal
Finance court focused its attention on the relationship and relative bargaining positions of the parties at the time the parties entered into the agreement. The significance of a prejudgment hearing to determine the presence
of a waiver of constitutional rights or of contracts with adhesive or unconscionable terms is evident when one considers the concepts of judicial
economy and fundamental fairness associated with affording debtors or tenants minimum due process.
Postjudgment procedures available to open or vacate judgments by confession likewise are inadequate to protect a person's property interest. Virtually
none of our freedoms would be secure if any person could be deprived of his
possessions without an opportunity to defend "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner." 9 1 A postjudgment determination of the validity of a
debtor's waiver, or the adhesiveness or the unconscionability of the contract,
is not a determination "at a meaningful time." The damage is done once the
judgment is entered. The creditor can immediately employ legal process to
enforce the obligation. 9" However, if Illinois courts would undertake a
meaningful analysis of the cognovit provision in a full prejudgment hearing,
they would help to assure that a tenant faced with the possible loss of shelter
will receive a fair hearing on the circumstances of his particular case.
ILLINOIS PERSPECTIVE

Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania are the only remaining states that provide
specific authorization for the entry of judgment by confession without
notice. 93 At the opposite end of the spectrum, Indiana, New Mexico, and
94
Rhode Island have declared the use of a cognovit to be a misdemeanor,
while in California the legislature has enacted numerous statutes limiting the
use of the confession of judgment clause. 95 In fact, a majority of jurisdictions void the clause as against public policy, regulate its use, or limit its use
in specific areas such as retail installment contracts or personal loans. 96 By
91. See note 80 supra.
92. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). See Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d
61, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368, 577 P.2d 188 (1978); Osmond v. Spence, 359 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del.
1972). But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 50(3) (1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2323.12-14 (Page
Supp. 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 738-739 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
94. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-2-25-1 [2-2904], -26-1 [2-2906] (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN.

9

39-1-16, -18 (1978); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 19-25-24, -36 (1968).
95. CAL. FIN. CODE § 18440 (West Supp. 1979); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1132(b) (West Supp.
1979).
96. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-2-415, -3-407 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 99
42-88, 36-26 (West Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.05 (West 1969); GA. CODE ANN. §§

110-601 to -603 (Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-34 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-3-306
(1974); Ky. REV. STAT.

§

372.140 (1978); MICH. LAWS ANN.

§

493.12 (Supp. 1977); MINN.

STAT. ANN. § 168.71 (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. Civ. PAc. LAW § 3201 (McKinney Supp. 1978);
OR. REv. STAT. § 91.745(b) (1977); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2224 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 422.405 (West Supp. 1978).
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contrast, Illinois courts have held the confession of judgment clause in leases
97
valid in judgments entered for rent due and interest.
Since 1970, faced with continuing challenges to the confession of judgment
clause, a number of Illinois decisions generally have upheld the earlier precedent. In First National Bank v. Keisman, 98 defendant debtors had signed
two judgment notes, but later challenged the entry of a judgment by confession and issuance of execution by the bank. They claimed that the procedure
used to enter the judgment constituted a violation of their constitutional due
process rights to notice and hearing prior to entry of judgment. Appellants
asserted:
[T]he mere signing of a document containing a warrant of attorney with
power to confess judgment does not constitute a knowing waiver of one's
rights, because consumers . . .are generally unaware of the existence of
such a clause . . ., or that the instrument is presented to them on a takeit-or-leave-it basis, leaving them no chance for equal bargaining; . . .the

waiver should be held ineffective as a matter of public policy because the
poor and oppressed consumers, borrowers, and lessees should be pro99
tected from depriving themselves of such vital rights.
The court observed that precedent to support defendants' precise contention
was lacking and it affirmed the concept that due process rights could be
knowingly and intelligently waived. Specifically, the court reasoned that
since this case concerned two "apparently knowledgeable businessmen and a
lawyer," the parties' due process rights had been "knowingly and intelligently" waived.'10 On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to break
new ground. It would recognize only that "[i]n a particular case there may
be reasons for setting aside a judgment entered by confession." 101
The only judicial condemnation in Illinois regarding the confession of
judgment practice is found in Scott v. Danaher.10 2 In Danaher, a threejudge federal district court was presented with the question of whether the
Illinois Garnishment Act, 10 3 in conjunction with judgments obtained by confession under the Illinois rules,' 0 4 violated the due process and equal protec97. Fields v. Brown, 188 I11.
111, 58 N.E. 977 (1900); Scott v. Mantonya, 164 I11.
473, 45
N.E. 977 (1897); Fortune v. Bartolomei, 164 I11,
51, 45 N.E. 274 (1896); Cutler v. Leader
Cleaners, Inc., 12 Ill. App. 2d 439, 139 N.E.2d 832 (1st Dist. 1957); Homewood v. Stein, 211
Ill. App. 359 (1919); Bowman v. Powell, 127 II. App. 114 (1906); Agnew v. Sexton, 86 I11.
App.
274 (1900). For other Illinois confession of judgment discussions, see Grundy County Nat'l Bank
v. Westfall, 125 II1.App. 2d 254, 260 N.E.2d 745 (3d Dist. 1970); First Nat'l Bank v. Galbraith,
271 INI.App. 240 (2d Dist. 1933).
98. 47 111.2d 364, 265 N.E.2d 662 (1970).
99. Id. at 366, 265 N.E.2d at 663.
100. Id. at 366-67, 265 N.E.2d at 663.
101. Id. at 366, 265 N.E.2d at 663 (emphasis added).
102. 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. I11.
1972). See also Graff v. Nicholl, 370 F. Supp. 974 (N.D.
Ill. 1974).
103. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 62, § 33 et seq. (1977). See generally White Way Sign & Maint.
Co., Inc., v. Seltzer Pontiac, Inc., 56 I!1.2d 342, 307 N.E.2d 386 (1974).
104. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 50(3) (1977).
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tion clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 10 5 The plaintiff had executed an
installment sales contract and judgment note for the purchase of a vacuum
cleaner. The contract and note contained a standard "cognovit clause" authorizing the holder of the note to confess judgment without notice upon
default of the note. The holder of the note confessed judgment against plaintiff without notice and directed the clerk of the court (Danaher) to issue a
non-wage garnishment summons against the plaintiff's bank. The first notice
of judicial action the plaintiffs received was from their bank-informing
them that their account funds had been "frozen" pending disposition by
06
court order. 1
After a detailed analysis of precedent, 07 the district court reaffirmed the
rudimentary constitutional principles that: (1) a person must be provided
with notice of a judicial proceeding instituted against him and an opportunity
to be heard prior to a deprivation of his property; 108 (2) there exists a strong
presumption against a waiver of constitutional rights; 109 and (3) for a waiver
to be effective it must be "clearly established" that there was an "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 110 The
court further emphasized that such rights must be preserved prior to the
deprivation of the property: "The fact that the judgment may be reopened
and the property returned to the plaintiffs does not mitigate against the fact
that the plaintiffs here are precluded from the use of their property for some
length of time.""'
The garnishment statute, by failing to provide for any means of determining the effectiveness of the debtor's purported waiver of his right to notice
and hearing prior to the issuance of a garnishment summons was, therefore,
held to be constitutionally defective."12 The court's extensive analysis and
discussion recognized that a layman of normal intelligence may have difficulty in comprehending the meaning of the terms employed in such a con1 13
tract and the legal ramifications flowing from the execution of it.
105. Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272, 1274 (N.D. Ill. 1972). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1, provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
106. Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272, 1274 (N.D. 11. 1972).
107. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Osmond v. Spence, 405 U.S. 971 (1972);
Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972);
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
108. Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272, 1275 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
109. Id. at 1277.
110. Id. at 1278, quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
111. Id. at 1275.
112. Id. at 1278. But see Zimek v. Illinois Nat'l Cas. Co., 370 Ill. 572, 19 N.E.2d 620 (1939)
(when creditor gives principal debtor proper notice of suit, due process requirements are fulfilled and garnishment statute is constitutional); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press,
Inc., 266 U.S. 285 (1924) (New York garnishment statute held to be constitutional).
113. Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1274, 1278 (N.D. Ii. 1972).
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By recognizing that the effectiveness of the purported waiver will
generally turn on the debtor's intelligence, state of mind, education, and
bargaining power at the time of execution, the Danaher court provided some
measure of protection to consumers without significantly impairing a
creditor-landlord's ability to obtain judgment. The opinion reflects an
enlightened judicial awareness of the realities of modern landlord-tenant,
debtor-creditor relations. Unfortunately, the posture of the federal court has
not been assumed in Illinois state courts' considerations of similar confession
of judgment cases.
In Babb v. Johnson, 1 14 a case involving a commercial lease, and Ives v.
May, 115 which involved a judgment note, the second district avoided ruling
on appellants' constitutional challenges to judgments obtained by confession
by stating that the issue had not been raised or decided in the trial
court. 116 In Ives. the court added the terse remark that defendant's
argument-that the clause allowing confession without notice is an unconscionable provision -"would be more properly directed to the Illinois legislature rather than to this court." 117
In Star Finance Corporation v. McGee, 118 a retail installment contract
case, and in Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 119 a lease case, the first appellate district rejected constitutional attacks on the confession of judgment
provision in section 50(3) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act. In both cases,
decided the same day, the court concluded that the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in Overmyer and Swarb, as well as the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision in Keisman, established that the confession of judgment
statute under attack was not per se unconstitutional. In each case, the court
felt that the Illinois statutory provisions for opening or vacating judgments
by confession afforded adequate opportunity for considering a debtor's claims
and adequately protected a judgment debtor's property interest.
In Irnco Hotels, the court further rejected the appellant's claim that the
mere signing of the document did not amount to a primafacie waiver of the

114. 5 Ill. App. 3d 191, 282 N.E.2d 266 (2d Dist. 1972). It is settled law that issues not
raised or considered by the trial court cannot be presented for the first time on appeal. See
Benson v. Isaacs, 22 111.2d 606, 610, 177 N.E.2d 209, 211 (1961); Village of Midlothian v.
Walling, 118 Ill. App. 2d 358, 255 N.E.2d 23 (1st Dist. 1969); Wilson v. White Motor Corp.,
118 I11. App. 2d 436, 254 N.E.2d 277 (2d Dist. 1969).
115. 5 Ill. App. 3d 193, 282 N.E.2d 193 (2d Dist. 1972).
116. Defendant Johnson, the assignee of the lease in question, presented a second issue of
whether a judgment entered upon a confession of judgment is void as against persons who did
not execute the lease. The court refused to decide the issue for failure to raise same at the trial
court. However, Illinois law is well settled that a judgment may not be confessed against one
who did not sign the warrant of attorney. Wolf v. Gaines, 33 I11.App. 2d 428, 179 N.E.2d 466
(1st Dist. 1961); Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Vance, 3 I11.App. 2d 1, 120 N.E.2d 349 (1st Dist. 1954);
Doss v. Evans, 270 I11. App. 55 (3d Dist. 1933). See also 5 A.L.R.3d 426 (1966).
117. Ives v. May, 5 I11. App. 3d 193, 196, 282 N.E.2d 193, 195 (2d Dist. 1972).
118. 27 I11.App. 3d 421, 326 N.E.2d 518 (1st Dist. 1975).
119. 27 Ill. App. 3d 225, 326 N.E.2d 542 (1st Dist. 1975).
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right to notice and hearing before judgment.120 Incredibly, the court found
that "the defendant's argument for a presumption against waiver-so that a
confession of judgment pursuant to contractual authorization cannot standis beyond the scope of existing precedent." 121 In effect, the court established the rule that waivers of constitutional rights are presumed valid and
that it is the defendant's duty to plead and prove that his waiver was involuntary and unknowing.12 2 This precedent cannot be rationalized within
the framework of existing constitutional law.
To further compound matters for judgment debtors and signators of instruments containing confession of judgment clauses, the Star Finance court
stated that there was "no authority for a requirement that a judicial inquiry
be made to determine the voluntariness of waiver before judgment." 123
These decisions cannot be squared with existing constitutional precedent or
with the overwhelming disfavor of cognovits in a majority of states. They are
weakened further by a rational, realistic observation of the widespread,
indiscriminate, and abusive practices associated with cognovit/confession of
judgment provisions.
Finally, the fifth appellate district followed D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick
and stated that cognovit clauses are not per se unconstitutional, but rather
they require judicial scrutiny only when the cognovit note is "the product of
a contract of adhesion, or [when] a great inequality of bargaining power
exist[s] between the parties, or [when] the debtor receive[s] nothing for the
cognovit provision." 124 Because none of these factors was present, and
defendant was a corporation, the court found the waiver to be valid.
However, as discussed earlier, the case of Personal Finance Co. v.
Meredith 125 establishes solid ground for challenging a confession of judgment clause as an unconscionable contract term. Scrutinizing a retail installment contract containing a cognovit clause, the appellate court for the fifth
district asserted that:
Courts will not permit printed, non-negotiated terms in a seller's contract

to waive the buyer's rights and eviscerate the negotiated terms of the
transaction, unless the buyer is aware of the terms. Viewed in this light,
unconscionability is merely the standard to determine the actual bargain of
the parties, of their "agreement." Furthermore, the language of a contract

120. Id. at 229, 326 N.E.2d at 545.
121. Id. It is difficult to understand how the court missed the United States Supreme Court's
strong presumptions against waivers in Overmyer, Osmond, and Swarb. See note 51 supra.
122. The court went on to conclude that appellant had not demonstrated that his waiver was
not effectively executed. Therefore, the trial court's denial of his motion to vacate was affirmed.
Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 I11.
App. 3d 225, 229, 326 N.E.2d 542, 545 (lst Dist. 1975).
123. Star Finance Corp. v. McGee, 27 I11.
App. 3d 421, 425, 326 N.E.2d 518, 522 (1st Dist.
1975). The court remanded for further consideration the question of whether the contract was
one of adhesion since the record was inconclusive on this point. Id. at 426, 326 N.E.2d at 522.
124. Burkett v. Finger Lake Dev. Corp., 32 I11.
App. 3d 396, 399-400, 336 N.E.2d 628, 631
(5th Dist. 1976).
125. 39 Ill. App. 3d 695, 350 N.E.2d 781 (5th Dist. 1976).
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is not controlling as to the parties' "agreement." Other circumstances . . .
are also relevant to the inquiry of the parties' bargain in fact. We believe
the relevance of these considerations expresses a legislative policy in favor
and
of courts' determining the actual agreement between the parties
12 6
against enforcing printed contract terms in a mechanical fashion.

The court analogized the waiver of defense clause in this case to a disclaimer of liability clause 127 and a confession of judgment clause in order to
indicate their usefulness as well as their potential for abuse. The close
scrutiny of waivers of fundamental rights and cautious concern for contractual fairness displayed by the PersonalFinance court provide guidelines for a
reasonable and enlightened approach to be employed by district courts prior
to entering judgments by confession.
Construed most narrowly, Illinois precedent provides little aid to persons
seeking to challenge confession of judgment provisions in form residential
leases. The lack of judicial concern for the oppressive results and abusive
practices associated with the cognovit clause is evident in the Illinois decisions. Only Danaher and Personal Finance offer clear guidelines for judicial
analysis of waivers of fundamental rights under constitutional or contract
concepts. Illinois' singular position is weakened by the long line of Supreme
Court decisions rejecting the validity of waivers of fundamental rights, favoring prejudgment hearings, and favoring close judicial scrutiny of potentially
abusive contract clauses. Illinois legislative enactments disfavor waivers of
rights and exclusionary provisions in many consumer transactions. 1 28
Hence, it is necessary that Illinois lawyers and judges inform themselves of
the authorities and policy considerations that support challenges to the confession of judgment clauses.
The Future Course of Illinois Law
The time has arrived for the judiciary and legislature to end the use of the
confession of judgment clause in form residential leases. The fact that a tenant, by merely signing a form lease, can waive the most fundamental constitutional rights of notice and opportunity to be heard, should be soundly
condemned by the court. Judicial and legislative resistance to invalidating
the confession of judgment clause in Illinois residential leases cannot rationally be supported.
In his lectures at Yale Law School in, 1923, Mr. Justice Cardozo discussed
the creative activity of the courts as both normal and appropriate:
rule which in its origin, was the creation of the courts themselves, and
was supposed in the making to express the mores of the day, may be
A

126. id. at 702, 350 N.E.2d at 789 (citations omitted). See also Hume v. United States, 132
U.S. 406 (1889); Lear v. Choteau, 23 I11.37 (1859).
127. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 80, § 91 (1977), declares exculpatory clauses exempting lessors from
negligence liability in residential leases void as against public policy. See also O'Callaghan v.
Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 11. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545 (1958); Strauch v. Charles Apt.
Co., 1 111. App. 3d 57, 273 N.E.2d 19 (2d Dist. 1971).
128. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 , § 513 (1977).
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abrogated by courts when the mores have so changed that perpetuation of
the rule would do violence to the social conscience . . . This is not usurpation. It is not even innovation. It is the reservation for ourselves of the
same power of creation that built up the common law through its exercise
by the judges of the past. 129

Illinois' judicial reluctance to invalidate the confession of judgment/cognovit
clause in modern landlord-tenant contracts appears to be based upon protecting landlord interests and upon a pointed deference to legislative resolution of the problem. 130 Neither rationale has a solid foundation. Further,
Illinois statutes provide landlords with an armada of alternate remedies: action for forcible entry and detainer; 131 suit for recovery of rent and other

damages;

132

lease termination;

133

suit for ejectment and claim for rent;134

and even distress for rent, permitting the landlord to seize personal property
of the tenant.' 3 5 The availability of these remedies is adequate to protect
the landlord's legitimate interests. These alternatives are both speedy and
effective. The additional convenience for landlords in obtaining a judgment
without notice is unwarranted in light of the fundamental importance in our
society of a person's right to notice and hearing prior to the deprivation of a
property interest. 13 6 An exhaustive search of the literature does not reveal
a single discussion on the plight of the landlords in the states which ban or
limit the use of confessions of judgment. Because the cognovit is a creature
of common law, Illinois judges need only follow the guidance of Mr. Justice
Cardozo, other legal scholars,' 3 7 and the Supreme Court to eliminate the
gross inequities represented by the continued recognition of judgments entered by confession, especially in consumer and landlord-tenant contracts.138

129. B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 136-37 (Greenwood Press Reprint 1973).
130. The only limitation on the creditor in the Illinois statute governing confessions of judgment is a procedural one concerning where the judgment can be entered. One commentator
noted: "Despite the [Illinois] courts' avowed restrictive view of confession clauses, the debtor is
in an unenviable position when the creditor applies to have a confessed judgment entered."
Confessions, supra note 2, at 144.
Also, the Supreme Court and the Illinois courts have opted for a legislative resolution of the
problems. In Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 202 (1972), the Supreme Court stated that "problems of this kind are peculiarly appropriate grist for the legislative mill." The second appellate
district in Illinois noted that the concerns of debtors "would be more properly directed to the
Illinois legislature rather than to this court." Ives v. May, 5 I11.
App. 3d 193, 196, 282 N.E.2d
193, 195 (2d Dist. 1972). See Confessions, supra note 2, at 157-58.
131. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57, § I et seq. (1977).

132.

ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 80, § 1 (1977).

133. Id. 9 5-9.
134. Id. 9 8.
135. Id. 9 16-35.
136. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
137. See note 13 supra.
138. See generally Berman, The Duty of Repair and Restoration of Leased Premises in Illinois, 53 CHn. B. REC. (1972); Kral, The Real Estate Crisis of the Inner City, 53 CHn. B.
REC. 367 (1972).
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The Illinois judiciary has shown a progressive attitude in its recognition of
an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases. 139 Even prior to
Spring, the first appellate district held a lease invalid and unenforceable
because it was in violation of statutory law passed for the protection of the
public.140 The Spring decision established breach of the implied warranty
of habitability as a valid defense to actions for rent and possession. As such,
it was based on the sound public policy of promoting decent living conditions for apartment dwellers. 14' Also, the implied warranty has been held
to apply to the purchase of new homes in Illinois. 142 In fact, Illinois courts
have gone so far as to recognize the Spring doctrine as the basis for a com143
plaint against the landlord rather than merely an affirmative defense.
Distinguishing between the policies favoring the implied warranty of habitability in residential leases, on the one hand, and commercial leases, on the
other, Illinois courts have refused to apply the doctrine in a commercial
lease context.1 44 The ability of commercial interests to possess a measure of
equal bargaining power, to possess some measure of freedom of contract and
to acquire legal counsel for representation in their contractual dealings account for the courts' disparate treatment. In Overmyer and Keisman, the
courts recognized this distinction in the context of confession of judgment
clauses and the effectiveness of waivers of constitutional rights. These decisions, however, strongly support the presumption against waivers and urge
procedures which provide for a determination of waiver prior to the entry of
a judgment in the noncommercial lease context. Close scrutiny of this drastic
contract term is well within the courts' powers and certainly voidable with a
minimum of progressive judicial attention.

139. See Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 I11.2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Comment, The
Landlord-Tenant Relationship Breaks into the Twentieth Century: The Implied Warranty of
Habitability, 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 513 (1978).

140. Longenecker v. Hardin, 130 I11. App. 2d 468, 264 N.E.2d 878 (1st Dist. 1970). In
Longenecker, the landlord confessed judgment against a tenant after he had been evicted for
nonpayment of rent. The tenant sought to open the judgment by asserting the defense that the
leased premises violated provisions of the Housing Code. Citing provisions of the Chicago
Municipal Code that prohibit the leasing of premises which do not comply with the Housing
Code or are not safe, clean, sanitary, and fit for human occupancy, the appellate court held that
the tenant had asserted a valid defense. Id. at 474-77, 264 N.E.2d at 881-83.
141. See South Austin Realty Ass'n v. Sombright, 47 I11.App. 3d 89, 361 N.E.2d 795 (1st
Dist. 1975).
142. See Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., Inc., 76 Ill.2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979);
Conyers v. Molloy, 50 111.App. 3d 17, 364 N.E.2d 986 (4th Dist. 1977). See also Towle,
Washington's New Home Implied Warranty of Habitability-Explanationand Model Statute, 54
WASH. L. REV. 185 (1978).

143. See Gillette v. Anderson, 4 Ill. App. 3d 838, 282 N.E.2d 149 (2d Dist. 1972).
144. See Clark Oil & Ref. Corp. v. Banks, 34 I11. App. 3d 67, 339 N.E.2d 283 (1st Dist.
1975); Ing v. Levy, 26 Il. App. 3d 889, 326 N.E.2d 51 (1st Dist. 1975); Clark Oil & Ref. Corp.
v. Thomas, 25 Ill. App. 3d 428, 323 N.E.2d 479 (1st Dist. 1974); Germania Fed. Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. Jacoby, 23 I11.App. 3d 145, 318 N.E.2d 734 (5th Dist. 1974).
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Numerous states have legislatively banned or severely limited use of the
confession of judgment clause in a variety of consumer contracts and residential leases. Also, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have
adopted, by case law or statute, the implied warranty of habitability in residential leases.1 4 5 The states with legislative enactments pattern their new
laws after the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, which was
drafted and approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1972.146 Conspicuous in the Uniform Act is the following:
Prohibited Provisions in Rental Agreements
(a) A rental agreement may not provide that the tenant:
(1) agrees to waive or forgo rights or remedies under this act;
(2) authorizes any person to confess judgment on a claim arising out
of the rental agreement;
(3) agrees to pay the landlord's attorney's fees; or
(4) agrees to the exculpation or limitation of any liability of the landlord arising under law or to indemnify the landlord for that liability or
147
the costs connected therewith.
Inclusion of such terms in a rental agreement would make the lease term
unenforceable under the Act.
In contrast, the Illinois General Assembly has continually frustrated attempts to pass a Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act. 14 8 In 1974, the
Chicago Real Estate Board adopted its Form 15 Residential Lease, which
was written by the Chicago Council of Lawyers. The new form replaced the
1967 and 1973 versions (Forms 12 and 12R). The goals the new lease seeks
to promote are:
(1) To accurately inform both parties of their rights and responsibilities;
(2) To formulate new solutions where old solutions were unsatisfactory,
cumbersome or nonexistent;
(3) To undermine as little as possible existing and needed rights and remedies;

145. Fillette, North Carolina's Residential Rental Agreements Act: New Developments for
Contract and Tort Liability in Landlord-Tenant Relations, 56 N.C.L. REV. 785, 787 n.16
(1978). See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1941, 1941.1, 1942 (West 1954 & Cum. Supp. 1978);
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 239, § 8A (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1977).
146. See Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act of 1972, UNIFORMNLAws ANN. (West
1978) [hereinafter cited as URLTA].
147. URLTA, supra note 146, at § 1.403. The Commissioners' Comment recognizes that
rental agreements are often executed'on forms provided by landlords and some contain adhesion
clauses: "This reflects the view of the great majority of states in prohibiting authorization to
confess judgment." Id. The comment cites as further support § 2.415 of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code which prohibits confession of judgment in consumer credit or consumer lease
claims.

148. Note 15 supra. See generally Bentley, An Alternative Residential Lease, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 836 (1974).
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(4) To produce a document which will not in itself be detrimental to the
ability of private enterprise to supply rental housing. 149
Reflecting upon the rapid deterioration of the landlord-tenant relationship,

the nation's rental housing inventory, and the dynamically interacting social
and economic forces at work, the Real Estate Board conspicuously deleted
the cognovit provision from its Form 15 lease. However, the new lease has
met with little acceptance among Chicago Area landlords. 150 Hence, resort
to legislative and judicial action is imperative to bring about needed change.
CONCLUSION

The widespread use of the form lease is an indication of its usefulness in
serving the landlords' legitimate interests. A form lease containing a confession of judgment clause, however, places tenants at a gross disadvantage
when a dispute arises concerning their tenancy. Only the sophisticated ten-

ant, or one who can afford an attorney, is able to forestall execution of judgment and hopefully receive a hearing on the merits. Continued recognition
of this "drastic document" cannot be justified when the competing interests

of landlord and tenant are balanced in the context of modern urban society.
Merely signing a lease does not demonstrate that a tenant desires to voluntarily waive his rights to notice and hearing, nor that he knowingly and
intelligently waives his rights with full awareness of the consequences. As a
remedy, providing for means to open or vacate judgments obtained by confession does not provide an adequate means to protect valuable tenant rights
nor does it allow for judicial scrutiny of oppressive contract terms at a meaningful time. Requiring a prejudgment hearing on the effectiveness of the
tenant's waiver would protect his constitutional rights without seriously
damaging or impairing the landlord's interest. Because confession of judgment clauses are of common law origin, the inequities created by their use
can be resolved appropriately by judicial action. Karl Llewellyn's insight on
the law provides guidance and wisdom:
It is society and not the courts which gives rise to, which shapes in the
first instance the emerging institution; which kicks the courts into action
....
In any event, if the needs press and recur, sooner or later recognition of them will work into the law. Either they will induce the courts to
break through and depart from earlier molds, or the bar will find some
way to put new wine into old bottles and to induce in the bottles that
elasticity and change of shape which, in the long run, marks all social
institutions. 151

149. Lyman, The New Chicago Real Estate Board Lease: Dispelling the Myths, 57

Cm.

B.

REc. 36, 36 (1975). See also Winter, The New Chicago Real Estate Board Lease: Notable New
Features, 57 CHI. B. REc. 44 (1975).

150. Feyder, 'Tenants Rights' Lease Form: No Big Hit with Landlords, Chicago Tribune,
Feb. 5, 1978, § 12, at 1, col. 1.
151. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 59-60 (1960).
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The courts are equipped with adequate judicial precedent at both the federal and state level, ample demonstration of legislative intent in a majority of
states, and significant scholarly criticism of the confession of judgment clause
to invalidate such clauses as unconstitutional, unconscionable, or the product
of an adhesion contract and therefore violative of public policy. These
changes are long overdue. A tenant/consumer no longer should be placed at
an immediate disadvantage through the possible involuntary waiver of fundamental constitutional guarantees the moment he contracts for the vital
necessities of modern life. Illinois law must be aligned with that of the
majority of her sister states, and use of the confession of judgment clause
must be entirely abolished in this state.

